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ABSTRACT
Since 2014, when a first-of-its-kind empirical study
looked at how public enforcers use their authority under
unfair and deceptive acts and practices (“UDAP”) laws, the
enforcement landscape has changed. Most notably, the
Trump Administration weakened enforcement on the federal
level. In the wake of this political shift, many state enforcers
rushed to fill the gap left by weak federal enforcement. At the
same time, the state enforcers themselves experienced changes
both internal (including changes to budgets and stated policy
priorities) and external (electoral changes regarding state
Attorneys General, changes to statutory authority, and other
changes governing the enforcer’s authority).
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This article presents findings from a follow-up study
examining the public UDAP enforcement landscape in 2018.
The principal finding is that states employed substantially
the same strategies toward UDAP enforcement in 2018 as they
did in 2014. This finding validates the central observation of
both years’ studies of state UDAP enforcement: states can be
characterized by distinct strategies of consumer protection
enforcement.
This information alone offers insight into the remarkable
stability of state UDAP enforcement, even across varied
strategies and a changing landscape. Other findings also
begin to shed light on how states might react to extreme
changes in enforcement on the federal level. For example, even
though six states have made public statements backed by
concrete actions to attempt to fill an enforcement gap left by
the absence of federal action, state enforcement case volumes
were up among all states. Public compensation, however, was
down among all types of enforcement actions in 2018.
Finally, comparisons of enforcement case volumes and
strategies across states that experienced other changes over
the time period—changes in leadership and statutory
authority, for example—mirrored the overall trend of an
increase in enforcement coupled with general strategic
stability. Strategies as a whole do not seem closely aligned
with partisan politics.
This study creates a needed point of comparison to the
2014 data, allowing stakeholders to ask deeper questions
about how public enforcers should wield their discretion and
authority to resolve consumer protection cases. With debt
levels in America at an all-time high, and federal enforcement
of consumer law at an all-time low, research-based action is
urgently needed to sharpen our understanding of the role and
potential effectiveness of institutions tasked with protecting
consumers from fraudulent lending schemes and oppressive
debt collection strategies as well as the myriad other types of
consumer scams that lead Americans toward more debt. The
data here give state officials and state-based reformers the

2021] PROTECTING CONSUMER PROTECTION

1159

information needed to maximize enforcement in a way that
improves consumers’ lives.
INTRODUCTION
Americans are drowning in debt.
A report from the Pew Charitable Trust has observed
that “[d]ebt is particularly problematic for low-income
households, whose liabilities grew far faster than their
income in the aftermath of the recession: [t]heir debt was
equal to just one-fifth of their income in 2007, but that
proportion had ballooned to half by 2013.”1 In a 2017 Harris
Poll survey of adults in the United States regarding the
factors that led them to credit card debt, a third of
respondents pointed to costs of necessities not covered by
household income.2 Individuals, families, and communities
of color carry disproportionately large amounts of debt
relative to other segments of the population.3
In our modern society, debt stems from many causes,
including home mortgages, medical emergencies, school
loans, automobile and other commercial purpose loans,
credit card accruals, and more.4 The necessities that people
must pay for, but cannot afford to buy outright, create
specific vulnerability. People in desperate circumstances due
to pressing needs, often already in debt from past choices, are
routinely targeted by companies who promote additional
debt through payday loans, foreclosure mortgages, debt
consolidation services, and other strategies. These structures
1. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., THE COMPLEX STORY OF AMERICAN DEBT:
LIABILITIES IN FAMILY BALANCE SHEETS 1 (2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org
/~/media/assets/2015/07/reach-of-debt-report_artfinal.pdf?la=en.
2. Erin El Issa, 2017 American Household Credit Card Debt Study,
NERDWALLET,
https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/credit-card-data/householdcredit-card-debt-study-2017/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2020).
3. See GOVERNOR ANDREW M. CUOMO, NEW YORK STATE: MAKING PROGRESS
HAPPEN 130–31 (2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files
/atoms/files/2020StateoftheStateBook.pdf.
4. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 1, at 2.

1160

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

often rely on high interest rates that only the desperate
would agree to pay and on incrementally timed repayment
obligations that, because they are hard to discern or seem
distant in effect, will typically cost borrowers far more than
they anticipated at the time of the loan.5 These
circumstances are only being amplified by the COVID-19
pandemic.6
Public enforcement of laws against fraudulent practices
should be a crucial tool to help people contend with the
scammers. Shutting down fraudulent practices and
returning consumer money, especially when defendants prey
on people already in debt or catapult people into debt
through unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices, is a
primary activity of government.7 Laws protecting consumers
from this type of fraudulent behavior have been codified for
close to 100 years.8
The federal government, however, abandoned its
enforcement role under the Trump Administration. In the
traditional consumer protection regulatory scheme, federal
agencies enforce federal laws and work concurrently with
states on enforcement of federal laws.9 States also have their

5. See, e.g., What to Know About Payday and Car Title Loans, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0097-payday-loans (last visited
June 27, 2021).
6. See, e.g., Rich Cordray, White Paper: Immediate Actions for CFPB to
Address COVID-19 Crisis (Apr. 6, 2020), https://medium.com/@RichCordray
/cfpbwhitepaper-193a5aed0d75 (“Scams are already popping up around testing
and treatment; financial scams will shortly follow, such as phishing scams
demanding sensitive banking and financial information to get stimulus funds, or
phony offers of loss mitigation or credit repair assistance.”).
7. See Craig Cowie, Putting Money Back into Consumers’ Pockets: An
Empirical Study of the CFPB’s Civil Penalty Fund, 2021 ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1424–
27 (2021).
8. See Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717
(1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58); Prentiss Cox et al., Strategies
of Public UDAP Enforcement, 55 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 37, 42–43 (2018).
9. Amy Widman & Prentiss Cox, State Attorneys General’s Use of Concurrent
Public Enforcement Authority in Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 33 CARDOZO
L. REV. 53, 53–58 (2011).
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own state consumer protection laws and enforcement
practices that are, in many cases, modeled on federal laws.10
Acting Director of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (“CFPB”) Mick Mulvaney, appointed in November
2017, immediately stepped back from enforcement and
announced the agency would leave it up to state entities to
fill the gap.11 The CFPB is one of two federal agencies
charged with protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive, or
abusive practices; the other is the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”).12 Though the FTC has played a vital enforcement
role, its ability to receive monetary compensation for
consumers through its enforcement actions was recently
curtailed by the Supreme Court.13
10. See CAROLYN CARTER, NAT’L. CONSUMER L. CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN
10 (2018), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/udap-report.pdf.

THE STATES

11. See Allison Schoenthal, Insight: A Shift in Regulation from the CFPB to
the States, BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 24, 2018, 9:33 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw
.com/banking-law/insight-a-shift-in-regulation-from-the-cfpb-to-the-states; see
also Mick Mulvaney, The CFPB has Pushed Its Last Envelope, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
23, 2018, 7:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-cfpb-has-pushed-its-lastenvelope-1516743561 (“We will exercise . . . the almost unparalleled power
Congress has bestowed on us to enforce the law faithfully in furtherance of our
mandate. But we go no further. The days of aggressively ‘pushing the envelope’
are over.”); Pamela Banks, Actions Taken by Acting CFPB Director Mick
Mulvaney that Undermine the CFPB’s Ability to Protect Consumers, CONSUMER
REPORTS (Apr. 10, 2018), https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/research/actionstaken-by-acting-cfpb-director-mick-mulvaney-that-undermine-the-cfpbs-abilityto-protect-consumers/.
12. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
1 (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cooperation
_agreements/ftc-cfpb_mou_225_0.pdf.
13. See AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, 141 S. Ct. 1341, 1344 (2021). Congress
is currently considering legislation to reinstate these powers. See, e.g., Consumer
Protection and Recovery Act, H.R. 2668, 117th Cong. (2021). FTC Testifies at an
Oversight Hearing Before the Senate Commerce Committee, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/08/ftctestifies-oversight-hearing-senate-commerce-committee (“Over the past four
fiscal years, pursuant to section 13(b) of the FTC Act, the FTC has returned more
than $975 million directly to consumers and won judgments under which
consumers received nearly $10 billion more through defendant-administered
redress programs. However, the Commission’s ability to keep getting such results
for consumers has been threatened or curtailed by recent judicial decisions.”).
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States are not particularly well-suited to fill the
consumer protection gap that is being created by the current
CFPB’s change in strategy and compounded by threats to the
FTC’s authority. Enforcement levels among the states vary,
and roughly a third of states bring few or no consumer
enforcement actions.14 Moreover, state resources are not as
deep as federal coffers. Going forward, the problem could be
additionally compounded by new laws that might preempt
states from enforcing federal consumer laws at all.15
Even if state enforcers might not be particularly wellsuited to fill the gap, they remain the best option. The
weakening of federal enforcement brought on by the Trump
Administration combines with the uneven nature of state
enforcement to bad effect. Deceptive actors flourish in this
environment, entangling people in a cycle of debt in which
they borrow more money to pay what they already owe.16
This cycle pushes increasing numbers of people into poverty.
The solution is plain: we must deepen the engagement of
federal enforcement authorities and strengthen state
enforcement authorities. Data are essential to both these
goals.
I.

WHY IS UDAP SO IMPORTANT?

Laws that hold bad actors accountable for fraudulent
behavior in the marketplace should be potent weapons in the
fight against poverty. Laws focused on unfair and deceptive
14. See Cox et al., supra note 8, at 88.
15. For example, during the Trump Administration, Justice Department
officials and former Education Secretary Betsy DeVos asserted that states are
preempted from enforcing federal consumer protection laws that would protect
individuals against agencies seeking to collect on federal student loans. See
Federal Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of Education’s
Federal Student Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servicers, 83 Fed.
Reg. 48, 10619 (Mar. 12, 2018).
16. See, e.g., THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., HOW DEBT COLLECTORS ARE
TRANSFORMING THE BUSINESS OF STATE COURTS 17 (May 6, 2020),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2020/06/debt-collectors-toconsumers.pdf.

2021] PROTECTING CONSUMER PROTECTION

1163

acts have been pillars of consumer protection strategies for
close to 100 years. These UDAP laws provide a key
regulatory structure to keep the marketplace fair. But laws
themselves do not fix the problem. Effective enforcement of
those laws is the key.
For purposes of this study, and the previous 2014 study
it draws on for comparison, the focus is narrowly drawn on
the main federal and state laws governing unfair, deceptive,
and abusive practices. UDAP laws are predominantly
“principles-based” laws.17 Such laws are meant to be flexible
in order to adapt to new scams and, in theory, give enforcers
broad discretion to enforce the laws against ever-changing
fraudulent schemes. This discretion, however, can
undermine uniformity, and this potential for variation forms
the crux of the criticism against UDAP laws: critics charge
that the economic marketplace isn’t provided adequate
notice as to which actions will be deemed “unfair” or
“deceptive” (or, in some cases, “abusive”).18 This criticism is,
at best, overly simplistic, or worse, deliberately misleading.
There is quite a bit of consistency in the types of scams that
are prosecuted.19 The discretion, as it is applied, seems to be
about whether or not to deploy resources for any particular
enforcement and, if so, which violations to prioritize. Part of
this choice seems dependent on the larger enforcement
landscape and whether other enforcers might be better
suited to target certain defendants. The data described below
sketch that larger landscape to provide more context to any

17. See Cox et al., supra note 8, at 44 (citing Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model
of Rules, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 22–23 (1967)) (using the term “principles-based”
to describe a more flexible type of legislative command or “a standard that is to
be observed, not because it will advance or secure an economic, political, or social
situation deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness
of some other dimension of morality”).
18. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, UNPRINCIPLED
PROSECUTION: ABUSE OF POWER AND PROFITEERING IN THE NEW “LITIGATION
SWARM” 1–2 (2014), https://instituteforlegalreform.com/wp-content/uploads
/media/unprincipled-prosecution.pdf.
19. See Cox et al. supra note 8, at 65–66.
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study of enforcement.
A. The Federal Laws
There are many federal consumer protection-focused
laws and regulations, and the legislative framework reveals
an intricate relationship among these laws. The main federal
laws regulating unfair and deceptive practices are the
Federal Trade Commission Act and Consumer Financial
Protection Act, otherwise known as “Dodd-Frank.”20
The Federal Trade Commission Act created the Federal
Trade Commission.21 Section 45(a) of this Act (known as
“section 5”) provides that “[u]nfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce . . . are . . . declared
unlawful.”22 It is under this authority that the FTC enforces
UDAP violations, within the statutory boundaries around
the types of industries covered. The FTC Act authorizes
enforcement against mortgage companies, mortgage brokers,
debt collectors, and creditors.23 Importantly though, the FTC
is not authorized to enforce the FTC Act against banks,
federal credit unions, and savings and loan institutions.24
The FTC is authorized to seek a variety of remedies through
settlement, but its administrative powers are restricted to
injunctive relief only.25
The Consumer Financial Protection Act (“CFPA”)
created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and
20. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2018); Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641 (2018).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 41.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
23. See id.
24. For a summary of agency jurisdiction to enforce UDAP against banks, see
Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of Attorneys General
After Dodd-Frank, 99 IOWA L. REV. 115, 120 (2013).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b), (m); 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). But see FTC v. Credit Bureau
Ctr., LLC, 937 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that “[s]ection 13(b)’s grant
of authority to order injunctive relief does not implicitly authorize an award of
restitution”).
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authorized the new agency to enforce multiple federal
consumer protection laws in addition to the expanded
“unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s] or practice[s]”
(“UDAAP”) prohibition within the CFPA itself. The Bureau
is also authorized to issue regulations under this authority.26
While the CFPB and the FTC share enforcement powers
in many of these areas, the CFPB has a wider reach than the
FTC. The CFPB is authorized to enforce prohibitions against
banking institutions.27 Moreover, the CFPB’s enforcement
authority goes beyond deceptive and unfair practices, to also
include a newer category of abusive practices.28 The CFPB is
authorized to seek a variety of remedies through both
administrative and judicial action, including injunctions,
public compensation, and civil penalties.29 Like section 5 of
the FTC Act, however, there is no concurrent private right of
action.
B. The State Laws
Consumer protection standard-setting and enforcement
contains multiple vertical layers and a history of both
concurrent and collegial federalism. As in the federal system,
states also have a variety of consumer protection laws and
regulations at their disposal. The two studies compared here
relied on data drawn from enforcement of the main state
UDAP laws. These laws have various informal names, but all
are modeled in part after section 5 of the FTC Act.30

26. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a); 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a)–(b).
27. 12 U.S.C. § 5515.
28. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a), (d). For more on how the CFPB has used its expanded
authority to target abusive acts, see Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau Law Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 TUL. L.
REV. 1057, 1099–1101 (2016).
29. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(2).
30. See Dee Pridgen, The Dynamic Duo of Consumer Protection: State and
Private Enforcement of Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Laws, 81 ANTITRUST
L. J. 911, 912 (2017); see generally CARTER, supra note 10.
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The main shared features of the state consumer
protection acts include prohibitions against deceptive
practices in consumer transactions and authority vested in
the state to enforce violations,31 coupled with authority for a
private right of action.32 Each state statute also provides a
remedial structure that includes injunctive relief, public
compensation, and, in all but Rhode Island, civil penalties.33
Beyond that shared framework, there are variations in
both the statutory and common law interpretations of the
statutes that create boundaries around the authority.34
These variations include substantive differences such as the
definitions of covered industries or the types of practices that
are considered deceptive.35 Other substantive variations
include whether a plaintiff must meet higher thresholds of
reliance or a heightened burden of proof that the defendant

31. The vast majority of states locate this authority within the State
Attorneys General’s office; however, a few states, including Hawaii, Utah,
Wisconsin, and Connecticut, vest authority in a state consumer agency, either
alongside or in lieu of the state attorney general (“AG”). See generally NAT’L
CONSUMER L. CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50 STATE EVALUATION
OF UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES LAWS app. C (2018), https://www.nclc.org
/images/pdf/udap/udap-appC.pdf. However, a few states, including Hawaii, Utah,
Wisconsin, and Connecticut, vest authority in a state consumer agency, either
alongside or in lieu of the state attorney general (“AG”). See HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 480-15 (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-2-1 (West 2020); WIS. STAT. § 93.06 (2019);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110d (2015).
32. See generally NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 31.
33. CARTER, supra note 10, at 11, 28.
34. For a list of recommendations as to model state legislation that would
strengthen the scope of state enforcement, see generally CARTER, supra note 10,
at 48–49 (recommending, for example, that states define unfair and deceptive
acts broadly, give states rule-making power, expand the industries that are
covered, remove intent or knowledge requirements, clarify presumptions on
reliance, increase civil penalty size, allow attorneys’ fees, give states more
investigatory powers, and adequately fund the state consumer protection
priorities).
35. Compare, e.g., IND. CODE § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(1) (2019) (explicitly exempting
insurance companies from UDAP enforcement), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.46 (West 2019) (explicitly stating that a violation of state unfair
insurance practices act is a UDAP violation).
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acted knowingly or intentionally.36 Procedural variations
also exist. These obstacles, for example, require advance
notice to defendants, proof of tangible injury, and cap the
amount of any civil penalties.37
II. THE 2014 FINDINGS
A. The Federal Enforcers
The newly constituted CFPB resolved a total of ten
UDAAP-based enforcement actions in 2014.38 The agency
focused on sellers of credit/banking products.39 That year, the
CFPB received all forms of relief in each case.40 Strikingly,
this means that the CFPB received public compensation in
100% of its resolved cases in 2014.41 The compensation was
typically distributed to all affected consumers.42 The CFPB
tended to focus its injunctive relief on customer
service/employee training provisions.43 Every case also
resulted in a civil penalty, directed to the Bureau’s Civil
Penalty Fund.44 The amount of money collected in civil
penalties by the CFPB was greater than that collected by any
other single enforcer—the only greater collection resulted
from large, multi-enforcer actions.45

36. Compare, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-15-02 (2015) (forbidding practices
regardless of actual reliance), with IND. CODE § 24-5-0.5-4(a) (2020) (authorizing
private right of action only for “[a] person relying upon an uncured on incurable
deceptive act.”).
37. See CARTER, supra note 10, at 40–43.
38. Id. at 80.
39. Cox et al., supra note 8, at 65.
40. Id. at 70.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 76.
43. Id. at 72.
44. Id. at 73.
45. See id. at 74. As Craig Cowie points out in his study of the CFPB Civil
Penalty Fund, this money is mostly paid out to harmed consumers. See Cowie,
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The FTC resolved a total of ninety-four UDAP-based
enforcement actions in 2014.46 The FTC employed two
distinct strategies.47 The first, Type A, was the most
common.48 These actions were administrative enforcement
actions for injunctive relief brought against large
companies.49 Type B actions were initiated in a judicial
forum against multiple, smaller defendants and aimed
toward stopping a widespread fraudulent practice.50 In these
cases, the FTC was able to obtain monetary relief in addition
to injunctive relief.51 The most notable FTC remedy in the
Type B cases was some form of asset freeze that would
dismantle the fraudulent scheme.52 The FTC injunctions
repeatedly focused on limiting the gathering and using of
customer data.53
As described above, federal enforcers played a key role in
the larger enforcement landscape. Each federal enforcer has
a slightly different statutory reach and focus, and the CFPB
was designed to expand and strengthen federal enforcement
in areas beyond the FTC’s powers.54 The CFPB’s powers were
clearly effective: no other enforcer was able to stop the
fraudulent practice, punish the fraudulent actor, and return

supra note 7, at 1424–27.
46. See id. at 80–81.
47. Id. at 80.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 80–81. In its most recent term, the Supreme Court declared decades
of FTC practice as contrary to statutory authority and held section 13(b) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act does not “authorize[] the [Federal Trade]
Commission to seek, and a court to award, equitable monetary relief such as
restitution or disgorgement.” AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, 141 S. Ct. 1341,
1344 (2021). This ruling effectively bars the FTC from the remedy noted in the
above text.
52. Cox et al., supra note 8, at 82–83.
53. See id. at 72.
54. This Article’s 2018 study only addresses the CFPB.
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money to affected consumers in each case.55 Moreover, the
statutory authority to enforce against banks and other
sellers of credit filled a unique gap. The large size of
defendants and the scale of the fraudulent practices that the
CFPB targeted, seen in the data by the large civil penalty
awards, show an enforcement strategy able to stop the
biggest and most disruptive—and therefore most
dangerous—frauds.56
The only other structure or entity able to marshal the
resources and extend its reach on a scale similar to that of
the CFPB is the large multi-enforcer action. In 2014, there
were seven large multi-enforcer cases and another sixteen
mid-sized multi-enforcer actions resolved by coalitions of
state and federal enforcers.57 A federal enforcer (either the
FTC or the CFPB) joined the states in a majority of these
cases.58 The large multi-enforcer cases were brought against
very large entity defendants only, including large mortgage,
telecom, pharmaceutical, and satellite radio companies.59
While the large multi-enforcer actions most closely align
with the CFPB strategy, these actions received public
compensation only about 71% of the time.60 These cases also
brought in the largest civil penalty amounts of all
enforcement actions, but only about 85% of the actions
generated civil penalties.61

55. See Cox et al., supra note 8, at 69–70.
56. See id. at 80.
57. See id. at 58–59.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 70.
61. Id.
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B. The State Enforcers
In 2014, the fifty-one state enforcers (including
Washington, DC) resolved a total of 671 UDAP-based
enforcement actions.62 These actions tended to focus on the
following
industries: construction,
motor vehicles,
63
foreclosure, and vacation/entertainment.
While states tended to bring a large volume of cases
against smaller defendants as compared with the FTC and
the CFPB, states did target larger defendants at times.64
Aggregate state enforcement data from 2014 reveals that
states received injunctions 95% of the time, civil penalties
roughly 73% of the time, and public compensation roughly
65% of the time.65
The 2014 data yielded seven distinct state enforcement
strategies.66 The first three strategies can be described as
gradations of no- or low-enforcement. Non-enforcers resolved
no UDAP cases in 2014, naturally.67 Low-volume
enforcement states resolved two to five cases.68 This strategy
resulted in at least one case with monetary relief greater
than the median level of relief seen among all 671 cases
studied.69 A few low-volume enforcers earned the title “lowvolume plus” because they resolved between two and ten

62. Cox et al., supra note 8, at 55–56. Also, note that “states” and “state
enforcers” throughout this paper will continue to include Washington, DC, as a
state unless otherwise noted.
63. Id. at 66.
64. Id. at 61.
65. See id. at 70.
66. An eighth strategy, which was really not a discernible strategy, was
labeled an “outsider.” These four states did not fit neatly into any of the seven
more clearly observable strategies, though each of these four states had their own
distinct strategic characteristics. For the most part, those unique strategic
markers also held true in 2018. Id. at 85–86.
67. See id. at 84.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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cases, but states in this strategy cohort closed at least one
large case resulting in monetary relief greater than $1
million.70 A fourth strategy group of states, “the outsourcers,”
was also low-volume but shared a couple of distinct
characteristics: they targeted large companies and received
only undesignated government money,71 and they were the
only states that appeared to sometimes incorporate the use
of outside counsel.72
The three remaining strategies had larger levels of
enforcement but different targets, relief, and roles in
multistate enforcement. The “street cops” brought a large
number of cases against individuals and small businesses,
and their cases were characterized by small monetary
awards to specific consumers or to consumers who filed a
complaint.73 A subset of street cop enforcers also resolved
some actions against large defendants with greater
monetary awards and sometimes froze assets.74 These states,
“street cop plus” states, also appeared on multistate
leadership panels.75 Finally, the “heavies” had a high volume
of cases against both the smaller, localized fraudulent actors
and also large entities.76 These states also sometimes froze
assets as a remedy, and they participated in the highest
percentage of multistate leadership panels.77

70. Id. at 85.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 85, 95.
75. See id. at 95.
76. Id. at 85, 96.
77. See id. at 95, 97.
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III. METHODOLOGY
This new study of cases resolved in 2018 was designed to
follow up on the results from the 2014 study. Given this
purpose, the methodology followed a similar structure,
although the number of data points coded was reduced and
simplified.
A. Data Collection
As with the 2014 study, open records requests were sent
to all state enforcers of UDAP-based consumer protection
laws. These requests yielded documents for thirty-eight
states. The remaining thirteen state enforcers (including
Washington, DC) statutorily limited their production of
documents to in-state residents, charged a high fee for
production, or otherwise rendered the documents
inaccessible.
Once the documents were gathered, a team of four
researchers determined which documents were in scope.
Scope was defined as a judicial or administrative resolution
of a UDAP claim dated between January 1, 2018, and
December 31, 2018. Further, scope included only those
claims involving a principles-based violation of an unfair,
deceptive, or abusive practice. This means that a state
enforcement action based on a purely rule-based violation of
a regulation promulgated under authority granted in the
state’s UDAP law was considered a “per se” UDAP violation
and therefore out of scope for this study.78 Any action that
included an in-scope UDAP claim, regardless of the presence
of additional claims and even if the additional claims were
rule-based, was in scope.
The state data collection period produced a total of 604
state enforcement actions resolved in 2018 among thirtyeight states. The Consumer Financial Protection Board
78. For more on determinations of a “per se” case and typical examples, see
id. at 54.
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enforcement actions were located on the agency website.79 In
2018, the CFPB resolved nine UDAP-based violations.
B. Study Design and Coding
As with the 2014 study, the 2018 data was gathered from
the face of the resolving documents. The information has
some built-in temporal lags, as the enforcement actions
included could have been initiated in any prior year. Actions
initiated in the year of study were not included in the data if
the action did not also resolve in that calendar year. This
design allows for a greater understanding of enforcement
levels and allows for some variation across years.
The primary research question was whether the
strategies identified in 2014 held constant. A secondary
research question was whether having two years of data
allowed for greater understanding of how internal and
external changes might affect enforcement strategy.
A team of three student researchers plus the author
coded the following information from the face of these
resolving documents:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

the form and forum of the resolution;
any outside counsel for the enforcement;
the unfair or deceptive conduct;
the type of product;
the presence of other claims;
whether injunctive relief was granted and, if so,
what type of conduct-resolving relief;
whether public compensation was obtained and, if
so, the type, eligibility, and amount; and
whether a government money in the form of civil
penalty, fees/costs, cy pres award, or other
government money was obtained and, if so, the

79. See Enforcement Actions, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www
.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions/ (last visited June
27, 2021).
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amounts and use of that money.
The coding followed a detailed code book, originally
designed and tested to reduce variations among coders in the
original 2014 data collection.80 Any coding questions were
discussed and resolved. Coding results were periodically
checked to control for any variation throughout the coding
period. Variance was minimal throughout. Cases were coded
between February and August 2020.
For each case, researchers coded roughly fifty points of
information about the case from information on the face of
the resolving document itself. The researchers also recorded
roughly fifteen additional points of information on the
defendants from information in the resolving document, and
outside databases containing company information,
including Mergent Intellect, Lexis Company Profiles, and
Google. Researchers were able to confirm the entity
defendant company information for roughly half of the
resolved cases. Indications on the face of the resolving
document, however, strongly suggested the general size of
defendant entities clearly enough that it was possible to
estimate whether target entities tended to be large or small.
C. Study Limitations
As with the previous study, there are limitations to the
data. Ultimately, the data represent a snapshot in time, and
it is, statistically speaking, a small set of data points. Since
our study scope only included resolved documents during one
calendar year, actions that began in 2018 but were not
resolved would not be included. Thus, part of any particular
office’s strategy might not necessarily be fully captured,
especially in times of great flux. This limitation is mitigated,
however, since we have a snapshot of 2014 for comparison,
and each single year snapshot actually represents multiple
years’ work product from the offices studied, because they

80. Cox et al., supra note 8, at 56–57.
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are snapshots not only in time but also through time.
Another limitation is that the study is not designed to
capture local enforcement of UDAP violations. Local
municipalities are a growing source of enforcement, and this
could very well alter a state strategy and thus affect the
overall landscape.81 In states with robust local enforcement,
the state enforcer might reasonably want to encourage this
vertical enforcement diversity and prioritize accordingly.82
Finally, a major limitation to the 2018 data is the
absence of documents from thirteen state enforcers.83 The
proliferation of limitations on the scope of state freedom of
information laws made it harder, even from 2014, to gather
a national picture of enforcement.84 Moreover, the lack of
freely granted fee waivers for academic researchers
compounded this problem. The result is a study from a
majority of states but not all.
IV. THE 2018 LANDSCAPE
Since 2014, the enforcement landscape has shifted in
both major and minor ways. The most obvious and impactful
shift was the change in federal administration in 2016. For
purposes of the CFPB, this change took root in late 2017
when the White House replaced Director Cordray with

81. See, e.g., Eli Savit, States Empowering Plaintiff Cities, 52 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 581, 583 (2019); Kathleen Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement of State
and Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 40 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1903, 1906 (2013).
82. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-19-4(a)(1)–(3) (2002); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§§ 17203–06 (West 2014); 815 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/7(a)–(b) (West 2008);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-21 (West 1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.020(4) (West
2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-130 (1985); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.48
(West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-201(A), 59.1-201.1 (West 2011).
83. Eight of the non-responding states were also low or non-enforcers in 2014.
Because of this, it is unlikely that the number of cases they would have produced
would have been significant.
84. The following states require requesters to be state citizens: Alabama,
Arkansas, Delaware, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Virginia. See also McBurney v.
Young, 569 U.S. 221, 222–23 (2013) (upholding Virginia’s resident requirement).
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Interim Director Mick Mulvaney.85 Director Kathy
Kraninger replaced Interim Director Mulvaney in December
2018.86
Since Director Cordray left his post, there is mounting
evidence that the agency fundamentally altered its
enforcement strategies across all its potential enforcement
actions.87 For example, Chris Peterson points out that the
CFPB
under
Trump-appointed
leadership
quite
substantially reduced its level of enforcement despite the
great need expressed through its consumer complaint data.88
Furthermore, scrutiny of what little enforcement remained
shows that fewer dollars went to consumers generally
throughout 2018.89 Although Professor Peterson analyzed all
enforcement actions, including substantive areas covered by
federal laws beyond the unfair, deceptive, and abusive
practices in the CFPA itself, this same pattern holds true for
its UDAAP enforcement.90 The United States House of
Representatives Financial Services Committee reported

85. Pete Schroeder, Trump Names Interim Consumer Agency Head, Likely
Sparking Showdown, REUTERS (Nov. 24, 2017, 4:25 PM), https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-cfpb-cordray/trump-names-interim-consumer-agency-headlikely-sparking-showdown-idUSKBN1DO2KQ.
86. Emily Sullivan, Senate Confirms Kathy Kraninger as CFPB Director, NPR
(Dec. 6, 2018, 2:17 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/06/673222706/senateconfirms-kathy-kraninger-as-cfpb-director.
87. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., DORMANT:
THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU’S LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM IN
DECLINE 27–28 (2019), https://consumerfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03
/CFPB-Enforcement-in-Decline.pdf. See generally STAFF OF H. COMM. ON
FINANCIAL SERVICES, 116TH CONG., SETTLING FOR NOTHING: HOW KRANINGER’S
CFPB LEAVES CONSUMERS HIGH AND DRY (Comm. Print 2019). This article was
written before the Biden Administration took office. Since then, leadership and
staff changes at the CFPB have focused on building back to pre-Trump
Administration enforcement level and strategy.
88. PETERSON, supra note 87, at 7–10. Beyond the numbers, it is important to
stress the toll these violations take on consumers. Id. at 8 (“An independent
textual analysis of the Bureau’s published complaints found that the complaints
of many consumers contained “markers of anger, fear, frustration, and sadness.”).
89. See id.
90. Peterson, supra note 28, at 1075.
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similarly that Trump appointees repeatedly diverged from
both agency precedent and career lawyer recommendations
to avoid requiring defendants to reimburse consumers for
fraudulent acts.91 The data examined in this study continues
to bear this out.
The agency’s interim and current directors portrayed the
shift in enforcement strategy as reigning in an agency that
had “aggressively ‘push[ed] the envelope’” on enforcement.92
But a closer look into the details of the shift in strategy
reveals something altogether different: a change in
philosophy about whether there should be enforcement at all
against the particular targets that the CFPB is best-suited
to address and, if so, whether consumers should be directly
reimbursed by those who perpetrated the frauds that
harmed them.
A. General Findings 2018
1. The CFPB
There are some similarities in the data tracking CFPB
enforcement strategy between 2014 and 2018. In both years,
cases were resolved against sizable entities, and all cases
resulted in injunctive relief. In 2014, the CFPB resolved ten
cases. In 2018, there were nine cases. The similarities,
however, end there.93 Even though at first glance the level of

91. See generally STAFF OF H. COMM. ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 116TH CONG.,
SETTLING FOR NOTHING: HOW KRANINGER’S CFPB LEAVES CONSUMERS HIGH AND
DRY (Comm. Print 2019).
92. Mulvaney, supra note 11 (“We will exercise . . . the almost unparalleled
power Congress has bestowed on us to enforce the law faithfully in furtherance
of our mandate. But we go no further. The days of aggressively ‘pushing the
envelope’ are over.”).
93. Multiple accounts portray an agency pursuing a political strategy over all
else. See, e.g., Robert O’Harrow Jr. et al., How Trump Appointees Curbed a
Consumer Protection Agency Loathed by the GOP, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2018, 4:16
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/how-trump-appointeescurbed-a-consumer-protection-agency-loathed-by-the-gop/2018/12/04/3cb6cd56de20-11e8-aa33-53bad9a881e8_story.html (“Some of the cases that did go
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enforcement looks similar, this is not the case once one takes
the view from the overall timeline of the agency.94 And, while
the 2014 CFPB strategy was characterized by the agency
receiving all forms of relief provided under Dodd-Frank for
100% of resolved cases, the agency pursued public
compensation and civil penalties in fewer cases in 2018. Only
56% of resolved cases in 2018 resulted in any public
compensation, and the amounts were significantly lower.95
The mean amount of public compensation earned through
UDAAP enforcement in 2014 was roughly $21 million;96 but,
in 2018, the mean dropped to just over $1 million.
Beyond public compensation, the 2018 enforcement
actions realized civil penalties only 89% of the time, and
those penalty amounts tended to be lower as well.97
Excluding one extreme outlier—one case in 2018, against
Wells Fargo, received a civil penalty of $500 million—the
mean UDAAP civil penalty dropped from roughly $6 million
in 2014 to $1 million in 2018.98
2. The States
Comparing the enforcement levels for the thirty-eight
states for which there was available data for both 2014 and
forward were drained of vigor, with penalties that fell far below what career
regulators recommended, employees said. The new pattern gave rise to a phrase
among staff: ‘The Mulvaney Discount.’”).
94. Looking at CFPB enforcement over the trajectory of the Bureau’s lifespan,
a bell curve emerges where cases resolved in 2014 were smaller due to the
Bureau’s recent formation. The bell curve peaks in 2015–2016 before beginning
a downward curve. See generally Peterson, supra note 28; PETERSON, supra note
87.
95. Only one case resolved in 2018 earned over $1 million for consumers. See
Santander Consumer USA, Inc., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/actions/santander-consumerusa-inc/ (last visited June 27, 2021).
96. Cox et al., supra note 8, at 56–57.
97. Dodd-Frank directs all civil penalties to be deposited in the Civil Penalty
Fund. See 12 C.F.R. § 1075.100–110 (2016).
98. Cox et al., supra note 8, at 75 (showing CFPB’s mean net government
money was roughly $6 million).
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2018, enforcement levels stayed relatively the same. Using
data from just these thirty-eight states, there were 555
enforcement actions resolved in 2014 as compared to 604
enforcement actions resolved in 2018, for an overall increase
of 9%. On average, enforcement case volume change per state
was up 23%, but this includes a wide range of variances
among the states.99 The largest percentage enforcement
increase was 509%, which increased enforcement by fifty-six
cases (from eleven cases in 2014 to sixty-seven cases in
2018).100 The largest percentage enforcement decrease was
seen in three low enforcement states that went from one or
two enforcement actions in 2014 to no enforcement actions in
2018.101 Within these thirty-eight states, enforcement case
volume levels were the same or up in nineteen states. Of the
remaining nineteen states, enforcement levels were down by
two or fewer actions in eight states.
The types of relief states pursued in 2018 show some
slight differences from 2014. Injunctions were slightly more
prevalent, the number of cases receiving public
compensation was down, and government money was
received slightly more often in 2018.
States received all three forms of relief in 36% of cases,
compared to 46% in 2014. Injunctive relief remained
overwhelmingly common, increasing even more in 2018 to
over 99% of cases resulting in some form of injunctive relief,
compared to 95% in 2014. The type of injunctive relief
preferred by states overall remained similar: general
prohibitions on violating UDAP laws and some form of
business ban were the most common forms of injunctive
relief in both years studied.102
99. This calculation also does not include the percentage increase for two
states (DC and Kentucky) that had zero enforcement actions in 2014 but five to
six in 2018. See id. at 88.
100. This state was New Jersey. See also discussion infra Section IV.A.2.b.i.
101. Louisiana, Oklahoma, and South Carolina each had a 100% decrease in
enforcement.
102. Cox et al., supra note 8, at 72.
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In the 2018 data, public compensation was awarded in
51% of non-default cases, down from the 2014 percentage of
65%.103 Although acknowledging public compensation
awarded, the resolving documents did not always specify a
dollar amount. Of the documents with a specified dollar
amount for public compensation in non-default cases, the
mean amount in 2018 was $560,219, compared to $370,000
in 2014.104
Cases in 2018 resulted in money awarded to the
government 77% of the time, up slightly from 73% in 2014.105
Variations among state statutes in civil penalty amounts and
provisions for awarding fees/costs, however, make this a
difficult area in which to compare dollar amounts among
states meaningfully.106
Most strikingly, the overall enforcement strategies
displayed in 2014 remained the same in 2018. Enforcement
levels were up overall, which bumped some states into a
slightly higher enforcement strategy band. And the use of
outside counsel, as observable from the resolving documents,
also decreased overall. Although nine total cases evidenced
outside counsel in the resolving documents in 2014, only one
case in 2018 appeared to incorporate the use of outside
counsel for the state. Three states formerly in the
“outsourcer” strategy therefore changed to a new strategy,
either as a non-enforcer or a low-volume enforcer. Generally,
however, strategy type—which is a function of not only level
of enforcement but also size of defendant, types of relief
103. Id. at 70–73. As with the 2014 data, the public compensation calculations
are made from the non-default cases only. This is because default cases are
unlikely to produce that money, and the concern here is how many dollars are
going back to consumers.
104. Id. at 78. As with the 2014 data, often resolving documents specify that
public compensation is obtained but do not list a dollar amount, either because
the total compensation amount is unknown or variable among consumers. The
percentage of cases with a known, specified dollar amount of public compensation
is 66% of public compensation cases.
105. Id. at 73.
106. See CARTER, supra note 10, at 16–22.
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sought, and leadership in multistate cases—remained
remarkably consistent.

Types of Relief Pursued by States
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Injunctive

Public
Compensation

State 2014

Government
Money

State 2018

a. Control Group States
For a baseline comparison between 2014 and 2018, the
current study further compared the results for each year in
states, representing all strategies, where there were no
discernible internal or external changes between the two
study periods. For these control group states, fourteen in all,
there was no change in state Attorney General (“AG”)
leadership (even if a new term), no changes to statutory
authority (either through legislative or common law
developments), no structural changes as to the authority of
the enforcer, and no public announcement of internal
prioritizing or restructuring to fill the gap created by federal
under-enforcement.
Enforcement level among these states as a group was
down. These fourteen states with no discernible changes
between 2014 and 2018 had a 16% decrease overall in the
number of enforcement actions resolved. The states in the
control group employed almost the exact same strategies
across the board. The few changes were mostly where a state
saw a slight uptick in enforcement or a larger monetary
award. One state, South Carolina, went from being an
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“outsourcer” with two enforcement actions modeled after
multistate cases that South Carolina did not join in 2014 to
a non-enforcer with no enforcement actions in 2018. But even
with the level of enforcement changing slightly, the strategy
there remained consistent in that the state itself was not
enforcing UDAP cases.107
b. Breaking Down the States by Interruptions
Given that the level of enforcement was up overall but
down in the states with no discernible changes, the next
question is which changes had the greatest effect on level of
enforcement. Authors of the 2014 study, including the author
of this study, suggested that certain internal or external
factors might drive enforcement strategy, for example,
budgets, statutory variances and changes, or the structure of
the body charged with enforcement.108 Now that there are
two years of data over a span of time, we can begin to analyze
that data by comparing it as organized by some of the
postulated factors. This section compares the data for states
that encountered some form of interruption between 2014
and 2018 to analyze whether certain types of interruptions
tend to affect case volumes or strategies of enforcement.
i. Internal Interruptions
Two categories of change agents or interruptions
occurred among the states since 2014. The first category is
best described as internally driven interruptions (internal,
that is, with respect to the state’s enforcement office;
interruptions possibly influenced by outside factors but
intentionally, affirmatively affected from within the office).
This category applied to the subset of states with enforcers
that made strong public pronouncements and otherwise took
steps to shift priorities, increase budgets, or restructure
internal departments to prioritize consumer protection in
107. See Cox et al., supra note 8, at 89 (describing South Carolina as
“[o]utsourcing . . . the case theory and development if not the representation”).
108. Id. at 102–03.

2021] PROTECTING CONSUMER PROTECTION

1183

order to fill the gap created by the Trump Administration’s
CFPB.109 These states include Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
Virginia, Maryland, California, and New York.110 Within this
subset of states, overall enforcement levels were up 171%:
higher than the overall data (9%) and directionally different
than the control group as a whole.
In 2017, Pennsylvania announced its new consumer
protection unit, headed by a former CFPB attorney.111 The
unit remains within the AG’s office, but focuses on
enforcement against “lenders that prey on seniors, families
with students, and military service members, including forprofit colleges and mortgage and student loan servicers.”112
The 2018 data reflects this new priority, showing a 145%
increase in case volume and a move from a “street cop”
strategy to a “heavy” strategy.113
In 2018, New Jersey launched a similar internally
focused “state level CFPB.”114 That year, New Jersey

109. See Letter from Eric T. Schneiderman, Att’y Gen., State of New York, to
Donald J. Trump, President, United States (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www
.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/12/sign_on
_letter_re_cfpb.pdf (signed by fifteen additional state Attorneys General and DC’s
Attorney General) [hereinafter Attorneys General Letter]; see also Attorney
General Grewal Announces New Leadership at the Division of Consumer Affairs,
N.J. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.nj.gov/governor/news
/news/562018/approved/20180327c_newleadership.shtml (describing steps taken
to create state level CFPB) [hereinafter Grewal Press Release]; Attorney General
Herring Expresses Unwavering Support for Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, VA. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.oag.state.va.us
/media-center/news-releases/1101-december-12-2017-ag-herring-expressesunwavering-support-for-consumer-financial-protection-bureau.
110. See sources cited supra note 109.
111. E.g., Ben Lane, Mini-CFPB? Pennsylvania Attorney General Launches
Consumer Financial Protection Unit, HOUSINGWIRE (July 21, 2017, 5:31 PM),
https://www.housingwire.com/articles/40758-mini-cfpb-pennsylvania-attorneygeneral-launches-consumer-financial-protection-unit/.
112. Id.
113. See supra Section II.B (defining these strategies).
114. See Grewal Press Release, supra note 109.
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increased its level of enforcement by 509%.115 New Jersey
also continued to employ a similar strategy even while
launching a new priority. The strategy employed by New
Jersey does not, however, mimic the former CFPB
enforcement strategy. Formerly grouped in the “outsider”
strategy, New Jersey tended to prioritize government money
over public compensation.116 True to this strategy, New
Jersey received public compensation in only 20% of resolved
cases, comparatively low for overall cases in 2018 (51%).117
Virginia also took steps to prioritize consumer protection
enforcement by establishing a predatory lending
enforcement unit in 2016.118 Virginia likewise showed an
increase in its level of enforcement in 2018, up 333%.
Notably, Virginia seemed to target payday lending and other
credit services, presumably a result of its newly established
predatory lending enforcement unit. Virginia also behaved
most in line with the original CFPB strategy, with injunctive
relief focused on training, strong public compensation, and
high amounts of government money.
The Maryland AG’s office also prioritized filling the gap
created by federal under-enforcement. Here, the office led
efforts to amend its consumer protection statute to
incorporate many changes designed to strengthen the ability
of the state enforcer to fill the enforcement gap.119 Notably,

115. New Jersey resolved eleven UDAP enforcement cases in 2014. The
number of resolved cases rose to sixty-seven in 2018. That number may have been
artificially high, as the number of resolved cases then decreased to twenty-six in
2019.
116. Cox et al., supra note 8, at 97.
117. Researchers coded New Jersey cases for both years since the mini-CFPB
initiative was announced mid-2018. In 2018, New Jersey received public
compensation in 20% of its resolved cases. In 2019, that rate climbed slightly to
27%.
118. OAG Completes Reorganization and Expansion of Consumer Protection
Operation, VA. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. (Nov. 21, 2016), https://oag.state.va.us
/media-center/news-releases/842-november-21-2016-oag-completesreorganization-and-expansion-of-consumer-protection-operation.
119. See S.B. 1068, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018).
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Maryland codified the expansion of UDAP protection to
include abusive practices, remedied some common UDAP
weaknesses, introduced a priority on student loans, and
incorporated a research and education component to increase
data collection toward improving outcomes.120 Maryland’s
legislative changes go beyond the internal staffing and
priority-setting and attempt to bring Maryland’s statutory
authority to the level of the cohesive approach to consumer
protection seen in Dodd-Frank. These legislative changes did
not take effect until October 2018, however, so they are not
entirely reflected in the 2018 resolved cases. Even so,
Maryland increased its level of enforcement 100% in 2018,
and it continued to employ a strategy aligned with the
“heavy” category.
California and New York enforcers have worked with
their governors to focus on budgetary increases that would
take effect in 2020 or beyond.121 These budgetary increases
are not reflected in the 2018 data, but they are noteworthy
in that these proposals reflect concrete attempts to restructure the state enforcer’s authority to be able to act more
like the CFPB.122 California’s legislative proposal, the
California Consumer Financial Protection Law, passed on
August 31, 2020.123 California’s law is the most thorough of
the state CFPB plans to date. The law creates a new agency,
the Department of Financial Protection and Innovation,
120. Id.
121. Suzanne Martindale & Michael McCauley, California Lawmakers
Approve Budget Proposal to Create Financial Watchdog for Consumers,
CONSUMER REPORTS (Sept. 1, 2020), https://advocacy.consumerreports.org
/press_release/california-lawmakers-approve-budget-proposal-to-createfinancial-watchdog-for-consumers/; see also Corinne Ramey, New York,
California Want More Power Over the Financial Sector, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 16,
2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-california-want-morepower-over-the-financial-sector-11584351002; GOVERNOR GAVIN NEWSOM,
GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY 2020–21, at 173–74 (2020), http://www.ebudget.ca
.gov/2020-21/pdf/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf.
122. See GOVERNOR GAVIN NEWSOM, supra note 121, at 173–74; see also Ramey,
supra note 121.
123. H.R. 1864, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020).

1186

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

which will have the same UDAP authority that Dodd-Frank
delegates to the CFPB, including the full array of remedies
and rule-making authority. New York’s legislative proposal
ultimately did not pass in the 2020-2021 budget.124 Neither
California nor New York increased their level of enforcement
in 2018.
Overall, these states have all taken steps to prioritize
consumer enforcement and the result shows that the
majority of these states greatly increased their enforcement
level since 2014 even as they remained in line with their
same strategies from 2014. Thus, these states continued to
act in many ways as they did in 2014, bringing cases typical
of state enforcement: smaller-dollar defendants with the
typical injunctions received by states,125 variable public
compensation,126 and, generally, a high percentage of civil
penalties.127 The industries and types of scams targeted also
appear to be consistent with general state enforcement
strategies seen previously, including many smaller
defendants in areas like construction, auto sales, and gyms.
While any enforcement increase is undoubtedly a
positive thing for a state’s consumers, a simple increase in
the type of actions typical of state enforcers does not
necessarily fill the unique gap created by the CFPB’s
withdrawal from the consumer protection field. The original

124. See S.B. 7508B, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2020).
125. New Jersey and New York stand out here for their strong injunctive relief.
New Jersey received a business ban in almost all cases, while New York received
multiple types of injunctive relief in each case, focusing most on stopping the
fraudulent practice.
126. While Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania remained in the street cop
plus or heavy strategy and received public compensation in a majority of cases,
New Jersey continued its outlier strategy that prioritizes government money.
New Jersey received public compensation in roughly 20% of cases in 2018 and
27% of cases in 2019. This remains an outlier among the states, and especially
among the “mini-CFPB” states. New York also had a slightly lower public
compensation rate of 36% of cases.
127. New York was a bit of an outlier among this subgroup, receiving civil
penalties in only 29% of cases.
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CFPB strategy was a clear one: enforcement against large
banking and credit entities with the full arsenal of relief.
That is a powerful strategy and one that states are not as
equipped to fill on their own, no matter how many actions
they bring. However, the state legislative and budgetary
changes in the pipeline hold great potential.
Types of Relief Pursued by
CFPB vs. “State CFPB” Initiatives
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ii. External Interruptions
In addition to internally driven interruptions, the other
type of change agent or interruption that we might expect to
have an effect on state enforcement strategy is characterized
by external elements changing the authority or
characteristics of the enforcer, for example, a new AG taking
office, a change in statutory authority, or a change in the
institutional authority of the primary enforcer. Between
2014 and 2018, all of these changes occurred. The effects of
such changes on UDAP enforcement, however, were mixed.
Leadership changes were the most common external
interruption. Of the thirty-eight states in the 2018 data,
twenty-one states had an AG change between study periods.
Of those twenty-one new AGs, six also brought a partisan
change to the office. Among all twenty-one states in this
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subset, enforcement levels were up 26%. Strategies,
however, remained similar, even with a change in party.
Three states had changes to their statutory authority
between 2014 and 2018.128 Maryland’s statutory change was
discussed above, as it was instituted in conjunction with the
internal policy-setting of the AG’s office. The Arkansas
legislature made a series of changes to its UDAP law
specifically seeming to target private rights of action.129
Consumer protection advocates rightly characterized these
changes as anti-consumer.130 Public enforcement in
Arkansas, however, was up 200% in 2018, from three
resolved cases in 2014 to nine resolved cases in 2018. This
finding introduces yet another indication of the complex
ecosystem of UDAP enforcement beyond public enforcement,
that is, the role and influence of the private enforcers. This
influence, however, is beyond the scope of this data.
In Georgia, the primary enforcer for UDAP claims in
2014 was the Georgia Office of Consumer Protection. In
2016, authority shifted to the AG’s office through legislative
amendment.131 In this case, the level of enforcement
remained the same, but the strategy changed slightly. In
2018, Georgia received public compensation in only 33% of

128. The Maryland legislature amended the statute in the middle of 2018, so
is not referenced specifically for statutory change in terms of the 2018 data.
However, the Maryland changes were legislative codifications of a professed
policy to fill the gap created by the under-enforcement of the CFPB, so this
priority-shifting of the office is captured in the internal changes described above.
See AG Frosh to President Trump: Mulvaney’s Attacks on CFPB Should
Disqualify Him from Leading Agency, MD. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/press/2017/121217.pdf.
129. In 2017, Arkansas amended its UDAP statute to require a showing of
reliance in order to bring a private cause of action. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88113(f) (2017).
130. See Allen H. Denson & Latif Zaman, States’ Divergent Approaches to
Unfair, Deceptive, and Abusive Acts and Practices Reveal Consumer Protection
Priorities, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups
/business_law/publications/blt/2019/09/abusive-acts/.
131. See S.B. 148, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015).

2021] PROTECTING CONSUMER PROTECTION

1189

its resolved cases. This is a low rate of public compensation
for a “street cop plus,” and indicates a slight shift in strategy.
Washington, DC, poses a curious example. In 2014, DC
amended the structure of how its AG is chosen. In 2014, the
AG had been appointed by the mayor. In 2018, the AG was
an elected position. In this case, the AG himself did not
change, but how he was installed changed. The DC AG’s
office went from resolving zero enforcement actions in 2014
to resolving six actions in 2018. Since the leadership did not
change, only the mechanism by which he gained office, it
raises a question about the role that the AG selection method
plays in setting enforcement priorities.
Case Volume by All Change Variables
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c. Multi-Enforcers
One last subset of the state data more directly addresses
the complex dynamics of UDAP enforcement: multi-enforcer
actions. In 2014, there were fifteen actions resolved by states
in conjunction with a federal enforcer, either the FTC or the
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CFPB.132 Ten of these were small, multi-enforcer actions
made up of one to three states and a federal enforcer.133 The
remaining five cases with federal involvement were joined
with the larger multistate actions.134
In 2018, there was noticeably less federal involvement in
all levels of multi-enforcer actions. The FTC resolved eight
small multi-enforcer UDAP cases in conjunction with one
state. The CFPB had no multi-enforcer involvement
whatsoever. Federal enforcers did not join in any large
multistate actions in 2018.
There were twelve multistate actions with no federal
involvement resolved in 2018, up from eight in 2014.
However, more of these cases, 72%, were large multistate
actions, involving forty or more states. In 2014 only 38% of
the multistate actions were large.135 An increase in cases,
however, does not necessarily mean more money back to
consumers. As with the single-state actions in 2018, the
percentage of cases receiving public compensation decreased.
While 71% of the large multistate cases resolved in 2014
received public compensation, only 44% of these cases
received public compensation in 2018.136
V. IMPLICATIONS
Data matter. We need to understand how the primary
consumer protection laws are being enforced in order to
target solutions that will hold bad actors accountable and, by
so doing, create an economy where consumers can begin to
rise out of debt. Research—on the nature of the problem and
on the viability of strategies for solving it—relies on data to
form and test interventions.

132. Cox et al., supra note 8, at 58–59.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 70.
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The data reveal that, in some instances, we must focus
on increasing the case volume of enforcement. This is
particularly true for the federal enforcers and the state nonenforcers. We need a strong CFPB.
But even among the state enforcers expanding their
enforcement efforts, attention is needed. For example, the
states attempting to marshal their resources in such a way
that might fill the gap left by federal non-enforcement are
clearly taking steps to increase enforcement. UDAP laws and
the history of their enforcement are grounded in two goals:
stopping the fraudulent act and returning money to
consumers. The current landscape is trending toward fewer
actions resulting in money to consumers overall, even with
ramped-up enforcement levels. The data reveal we need to
focus attention on increasing the percentage of cases
receiving public compensation. This was down across all
enforcers in 2018.
The data also continue to discredit some of the common
attacks against public UDAP enforcement. For example,
critics continue to claim that outside counsel is a major
problem in UDAP enforcement, even in the face of data
showing otherwise.137 Another repeated criticism of state
AGs is that they are primarily motivated by personal
political concerns. As the comparative data reveal, a state
AG’s strategy of UDAP enforcement tends to hold steady
even through leadership and party changes. While the newer
focus from some state AGs on filling the gap of federal underor non-enforcement might be cast as having some political
valance, it is not indicative of the general criticism of a more
personal, transactional type politics.138

137. See generally Cary Silverman & Jonathan L. Wilson, State Attorney
General Enforcement of Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices Laws: Emerging
Concerns and Solutions, 65 KAN. L. REV. 209 (2016).
138. See Cox et al., supra note 8, at 40 (describing criticism of state AG
enforcement as driven by personal gain).
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Further, it does not appear in the data that UDAP
enforcement at the state level is driven by partisan politics.
We see from both sets of data that the strategies do not
neatly sort themselves into traditional red state/blue state
divides.139 The states reflect less partisanship overall. States
that saw a change in AG political party between 2014 and
2018 saw changes, and sometimes dramatic changes. But
there was not any clear ideological pattern. This agrees
with—and validates—the 2014 data. Protecting consumers
from scams does not seem to be an overwhelmingly
ideological point at the state level.
At the same time, there are ideological and partisan
dynamic effects throughout the larger enforcement
landscape. For example, the Trump Administration
campaigned on loosening regulations and relaxing
enforcement on banks. At the federal level, clashing
ideologies between the Obama CFPB and the Trump CFPB
are stark. This ideological divide had ripple effects
throughout the system, likely driving the general increase in
state enforcement that we see in 2018 and certainly driving
the actions of the state AGs that are prioritizing filling the
enforcement gap. We also see a retrenchment from federal
involvement in multi-enforcer enforcement actions.
Finally, a recent criticism emerging as AGs shine a light
on federal under-enforcement is that AGs will prioritize large
nationally focused cases to the detriment of their state
consumers who are being harmed by the smaller-dollar, local
fraud that is so pervasive.140 Again, the data directly refute
this concern. The states that are most vocal about filling in
139. See id. at 65–66.
140. Elysa M. Dishman, Enforcement Piggybacking and Multistate Actions,
2019 B.Y.U. L. REV. 421, 443 (“While it may be necessary in some instances to
have overlapping actions, more often in the context of major corporate fraud,
there is a danger of over-enforcing these types of actions at the expense of
pursuing other actions. The overenforcement in this category of actions means
that, with scarce enforcement resources, other types of actions will go underenforced, such as small-scale fraudsters, Ponzi schemes, and other less splashy
but important enforcement areas.”).
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the gap are instead increasing enforcement across the board,
both the localized smaller dollar fraud as well as the larger
national fraudulent schemes.
CONCLUSION
This study is meant to provide comparative data to build
on and contextualize the findings from the 2014 data. With
two years of data, separated by a major federal change in
priorities, we can begin to understand some of the complex
strands of influence and policy that might underlie UDAP
enforcement. The data clarify that many criticisms of state
AG enforcement, often framed in terms of corruption and
political ambition, do not seem to reflect the actual
enforcement practices of the states. The debate over public
enforcement instead needs to be re-centered on the vital
consumer protection role UDAP statutes play in people’s
lives and well-being, how to encourage a robust and
accountable diverse uniformity of state enforcement, and the
continuity of relationship between the federal and state
enforcers. The data presented here will allow stakeholders to
implement strategies that will strengthen UDAP protection
and, most importantly, continue to return money to
defrauded consumers. As it was a decade ago when thenProfessor Elizabeth Warren was writing about the need for a
unified federal enforcement strategy, enforcement
effectiveness must be judged at least in part based on how
well it stops the most disruptive defendants and makes a
difference in people’s lives.141

141. Elizabeth Warren, Warren Outlines CFPB’s Mission for Consumers, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2011, at 10, 103.

